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[Abstract]  We identify the determinants of service trade and foreign affiliate sales in a
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trading partners, as well as new indicators for barriers to service imports and foreign
affiliate sales. We emphasize the strong links between service FDI and trade, since a large
proportion of trade is facilitated through foreign affiliate sales. Trade barriers and
corruption in the importing country have a strong negative impact on service trade and
foreign affiliate sales. We find a strong home market effect in service trade, and rich
countries do not tend to import more, which may indicate that rich countries have a
competitive advantage in service trade. Free trade agreements do not contribute to
increased service trade. A full liberalization of international trade in services in our model,
lifts exports by as much as 50% for some countries, and no less than 30%.
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 1. Introduction 
The composition of global production and trade has changed dramatically 
over the last decades. Primary and secondary sectors account for a declining 
share, while the relative importance of the tertiary service sectors is growing 
fast. The rapid development and deployment of new information and 
communication technology have contributed to strengthen the importance 
and volume of international service trade. Heavy deregulation of previously 
state-controlled service sectors, such as telecommunication and land 
transport, has enabled companies to enter new markets outside their home 
country. Also, multilateral efforts to liberalize service trade are now catching 
speed through the GATS and other extensive regional agreements like 
NATFA and the EU.  
 
Although international trade in services clearly plays an ever more 
important role in the global economy, there is a lack of empirical studies that 
map the determinants driving such trade. This comes as no surprise since 
data availability has been strongly limited. However, the problem has 
recently been alleviated as the OECD has started to publish bilateral service 
trade figures for its member countries, see OECD (2002). A second problem 
that has strong relevance for the empirical study of cross border service trade 
is the fact that a large proportion of such trade is mediated through foreign 
affiliate sales. According to Karsenty (2000), approximately 40% of all 
service trade relates to the activities of foreign subsidiaries, which again 
requires some form of service sector FDI. Consequently, the traditional 
methods for collection of data on cross border trade in goods are not well 
suited for mapping trade in services. To deal with this problem, the UN in 
cooperation with the EU, IMF, WTO and the OECD has now published a 
manual on statistics of international trade in services (United Nations, 2002), 
which describes in detail how countries should collect service trade data. 
Unfortunately, only a few have initiated programs to follow up the 
procedures outlined in the manual.   
 
Impediments to international commodity trade can easily be measured in 
terms of trade barriers like tariffs and quotas, but impediments to 
international trade in services are more complex and harder to quantify. 
Here, more diffuse measures like license requirements, national contents 
requirements, policies that hinder the movement of core personnel or the 
repatriation of profits earned by foreign companies, are all examples of 
impediments that are hard to quantify, yet strongly relevant for the service 
sectors. Nevertheless, a few institutions have recently constructed databases 
that contain quantitative indicators mapping impediments to service trade in 
a large number of countries. An excellent example is the project 
administered by the Australian Productivity Commission1, which is 
documented by Findlay and Warren (2000). Furthermore, the World Bank is 
now finalizing a database on measures affecting trade in services. 
 
In this paper, we estimate a gravity model that identifies the determinants 
of international trade and foreign affiliate sales in services. We employ 
                                                 
1 http://www.pc.gov.au/research/memoranda/servicesrestriction/index.html#book 
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recently released data on international trade and FDI in services between the 
OECD countries to their trading partners, as well as data on the impediments 
to such trade. We find a clear home market effect in service trade, as the 
GDP of the exporting country has a stronger impact than the GDP of the 
importing country. This is in line with Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2001) 
and is consistent with the idea that services are of a highly heterogeneous 
nature. Our results show that trade barriers are detrimental to trade, but even 
more to service foreign affiliate sales. Corruption in the importing country 
tends to discourage service trade, whereas a common membership in a 
regional free trade agreement has no significant effect. This may reflect that 
many regional free trade agreements, as of today, do not emphasize the 
liberalization of service trade. Geographical distance is consistently more 
important for traditional service exports than for service foreign affiliate 
sales. Furthermore, we find clear signs of a competitive advantage in service 
production and exports in rich countries (measured in terms of GDP per 
capita), as rich countries tend to be more service export intensive, but do not 
tend to import more services. 
 
Our study shows that a full removal of barriers to international service 
trade and foreign affiliate sales may increase trade by as much as 50%. 
Spain, Japan, Korea and Ireland will be the largest winners, while France, 
Germany and the Nordic countries like Sweden, Norway and Denmark will 
experience more moderate gains from liberalization (closer to 30%). 
However, when it comes to exports, there are no losers from service 
liberalization in our study. A simple causality test reveals that service 
exports and FDI are complements and not substitutes, but here we face large 
aggregation problems. 
  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to 
the size, composition and importance of international trade in services. In 
section 3, we discuss the gravity model and its relevance for service trade. 
Here, we briefly review the earlier literature using gravity models and relate 
this work to theoretical contributions. Section 4 presents data and the model 
specifications. In section 5 we discuss the results, while section 6 concludes.  
  
2.  Characteristics and patterns of service trade and FDI  
There are two important characteristics of services that clearly distinguish 
trade in services from trade in goods. First, production and consumption of a 
service must often appear simultaneously. Communication services serves as 
a good example. Once you call someone, the telephone company must 
instantaneously respond by producing the requested line connection.2 
Second, services have an intangible or non-material nature. That is, services 
cannot be measured in traditional volume or metric terms. In his seminal 
                                                 
2 One may claim that such services are non-storable. However, a considerable amount of 
services, like R&D, business consulting, literature, film and video services are easily 
stored and do not demand the outlined production-consumption simultaneity. Hence, the 
simultaneity condition is not a necessary condition for an activity to be characterized as a 
service. 
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paper «On goods and services», Hill (1977) defined services as the 
transformation of already existing goods and consumers. Here, the 
production of a movie may serve as a good example. In physical terms, a 
movie is only a transformation of an existing, yet empty roll of film. Also, 
health services clearly contribute to transform a consumer (patient) by 
improving her health condition. Both the simultaneity condition and the 
intangible nature of services often require that suppliers and consumers are 
physically located at the same place. Furthermore, due to the intangible 
nature, the simultaneity condition and the question of geographic proximity, 
services are easily differentiable. The same service provided in Madrid and 
Tokyo is still different due to location.  
 
According to Tirole (1988), the quality or properties of a good cannot 
always be identified before it is purchased or consumed.  Tirole labels such 
goods as experience goods or credence goods. Apparently, most services are 
experience goods, both because production and consumption is performed 
simultaneously and because services often are highly differentiated. 
Consequently, consumers face a problem of asymmetric information and 
become the uninformed principal in a moral hazard situation. In such 
situations, the service supplier has less incentive to provide a high quality 
product. However, if the supplier operates in a market where repeated 
purchases are common, the consumer can monitor the service quality over 
time. Alternatively, to avoid some of the information disadvantages, 
consumers can co-operate by generating systems of reputation regarding 
service providers. Hence, reputation becomes one of the most important 
factors of competition in the service segment. As Sapir (1991) points out, 
service producers often become multinational to be able to follow consumers 
wherever they have a reputation advantage. 
 
The WTO/GATS classification of service trade modes has now become 
the ruling approach to the analysis of international service trade. Four 
possible modes are identified: 
 
Mode 1: Cross-border supply of services. Buyer and seller are separated 
geographically. Transportation of the service occurs through an electronic 
network, for example via phone or email, or, if the service can be embodied 
in a physical good, via traditional means of transportation. 
 
Mode 2: Consumers travelling abroad. Here, international tourism and 
education services may serve as good examples. 
 
Mode 3: Firms establish a foreign affiliate. This is the traditional way of 
supplying business consulting services and financial services. Such trade 
requires some form of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
 
Mode 4:  The presence of natural persons. In other words, producers travel 
abroad to provide the service.  
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According to Karsenty (2000), mode 1 and mode 3 trade dominate the 
pattern of international service trade, where each category represents 
approximately 40% of total service trade (see Table 1). Mode 4 trade plays a 
marginal role and according to the schedules of the GATS, it is also here we 
find the strongest barriers to trade. 
 
Table 1: International trade in services by GATS mode 
classification: 1997 
Mode BnUSD % 
Mode 1 890 41.0% 
Mode 2 430 19.8% 
Mode 3 820 37.8% 
Mode 4 30 1.4% 
Total 2170 100% 
Source: Karsenty (2000) 
 
In Figure 1, we plot the service share of GDP and the share of service 
exports in total exports for the OECD countries over the period 1974 to 
2000.  The share of services in GDP has increased steadily over the whole 
period and now represents 2/3 of all economic activity in the OECD area. 
For the world as a whole, the World Bank (2001) estimates that service 
industries contribute to 60 per cent of value added.  The share of services in 
total OECD export rose from 17% in 1974 to 26% in 2001.  
 
Fig. 1. Service exports and GDP
- relative to total exports and GDP
Source: OECD STAN database and OECD annual national accounts
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It is important to recognize that these figures miss a crucial element of 
overall service trade, since they only to a limited extent include mode 3 trade 
through foreign affiliate sales. Thus, there is reason to claim that that the 
share of services in total exports is considerably higher than what is reported 
in the official statistics. One way to approach this deficiency is to use the 
outward FDI stock as a proxy for foreign affiliate sales. There have been 
several studies measuring the aggregate relationship between FDI stocks and 
affiliate sales. UNCTAD (1996) estimates that a $1 FDI stock produced $3 
in goods and services in 1993. Petri (97) finds that $1 FDI stock invested in 
the service sector generates $1 in service production. USITC (95), which has 
the most extensive database on US affiliate sales, finds that, on aggregate, $1 
FDI stock in the US service sector generated $0.6 in sales in the US 
domestic service market in 1992, however, their numbers vary considerably 
when examining the relationship sector by sector. The service share in 
outward FDI stocks for OECD countries in 1999 was almost 60% (OECD 
International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook). This indicates that 
mode 3 trade plays a central role in the overall trade in services and that its 
role is becoming ever more important. 
 
International statistics clearly show that rich countries both have a 
larger service sector and a higher share of services in overall exports. 
This pattern is illustrated in Figure 2. The pattern described in Figure 
3 is more surprising, however. Here, we depict the share of services in 
overall imports on services as percent of GDP. The negative 
relationship illustrates that richer countries may have a competitive 
advantage in service production and trade, i.e. they export more and 
import less. The pattern could be a direct consequence of the fact that 
these countries have a larger and more developed service sector, 
providing services of higher quality. We will return to this pattern in 
our empirical analysis in Section 4, but only note that the wealth of an 
importing country does not seam to foster service trade in our 
analysis.  
 
Figure 2. GDP, service value added and service exports 
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Figure 3. The service economy and imports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  The gravity model and its relevance for service trade 
The gravity equation first appeared in the empirical literature with the 
contributions of Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963). The standard 
model is usually specified as follows: 
 
    ijjiijij YYDT E=
321 bbb ,  
 
where ijT  is trade between country i to j, iY is GDP in country i, ijD  
represents distance between the two countries and ijE  is a standard error 
term. Distance is usually interpreted as a proxy for transaction costs. The 
income elasticities are usually found to be in the area around one, while the 
distance elasticity is found to be somewhere between –0.9 and –1.5, see e.g. 
Frankel (1991) and Learner (1993).  
 
The gravity model for international trade has long been criticized for not 
having a clear theoretical basis. Although the model first appeared as a pure 
empirical relationship, several theoretical explanations have later appeared in 
the literature. Helpman (1987) used the good fit from gravity models as an 
argument supporting the new trade theory. Deardorff (1995) showed that the 
model is consistent with standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory of 
international trade. Moreover, Anderson (1979) developed a general 
equilibrium model, assuming differentiated products and CES preferences, 
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 share of services in imports:   Fitted values
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where a reduced-form gravity relationship appears. Thus, economic theory 
justifies the gravity model from a multitude of model perspectives.  
 
On the other hand, there have been no formal attempts to provide a theory 
that justify the use of gravity models to predict foreign affiliate sales. 
Markusen & Venables (1998) however, have constructed a theory explaining 
national and foreign affiliate activity as a function of country income and 
transport costs. Their results are in line with the predictions of the gravity 
model.3  
 
As discussed above, international service trade has some unique 
properties that make the gravity model appealing. First, the importance of 
physical proximity between producer and consumer should give the distance 
effect a strong boost. For instance, Marshall (1987) examines three 
geographical regions in the UK and finds that local manufacturers purchase 
80% of their services by firms located in the same region.  
 
Second, service products are often differentiated by quality and location, 
which may give rise to monopolistic competition. In a Helpman Krugman - 
style “new trade theory” model (NTT), these attributes are the driving force 
behind intra-industry trade. In the gravity model trade is maximized when 
ji YY =  which is highly consistent with the predictions of the NTT-model. 
Helpman (1987) constructed an econometric specification of the NTT 
model, quite similar to a gravity specification.  His results gave support for 
the NTT model. Notice also that other models such as a HOS-style model or 
any model with an “Armington” demand side are compatible with the fact 
that large income differences produce low trade (Leamer and Levinsohn, 
1995).  
 
Third, we know that the market for services is often characterized by 
asymmetric information where reputation and signaling e.g. through 
marketing play a central role. Melchior (2002) has expanded the traditional 
intra industry trade model to include a mechanism which links market 
investments (advertising, etc) to trade. He assumes that each firm can invest 
in endogenous sunk costs that will increase demand for their product. The 
model predicts that firms will be more export-oriented if their market 
investments are not very efficient (does not increase demand much) and if 
trade costs are low. If investments are efficient, the presence of transport 
costs will increase the total payoff to local investments relative to foreign 
investments and trade will decline. In other words, firms become more home 
market oriented when the efficiency of the sunk costs increase. How does 
this result affect the gravity model? If trade costs increase with distance, the 
elasticity of exports with respect to distance will be higher in sectors in 
which fixed market investments are important, such as service sectors. 
 
                                                 
3 The model only considers horizontal FDI. This feature of the model makes it appealing in 
relationship to service trade: Vertical FDI is probably not important in the service segment. 
In later papers (Carr, Markusen and Maskus, 2001 and Blonigen, 2002), the theories of 
horizontal and vertical FDI and the knowledge-capital theory are tested empirically, and 
their results give strong support for the horizontal model. 
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Other gravity studies of service trade  
As far as we know, there have been no direct attempts to use the gravity 
framework to estimate the determinants of service trade and FDI. However, 
a recent paper by Mirza and Nicoletti (2004) develops a model that allows 
them to map whether service trade deviates from trade in goods, since 
service trade requires inputs both from the exporting and importing country. 
The empirical specification of the model is in fact an extended gravity 
model, and they too employ the newly developed OECD data on bilateral 
trade in services, yet they do not look at FDI and foreign affiliate sales, and 
devote less attention to service trade barriers. Their results give strong 
support to the outlined hypothesis. We will discuss their conclusions further 
in section 5, since the study actually presents an alternative interpretation to 
some of our results.  
 
There exist studies that examine total trade and FDI within a 
gravity framework. Brenton, Di Mauro and Lücke (1998) assess the 
impact on bilateral trade and FDI of the deepening integration 
between the EU and the CEECs. Using a fixed effects specification, 
they find that income growth and business-friendly government 
policies are key determinants of both FDI and trade. However, they do 
not find evidence supporting the hypothesis that the CEECs may 
increase their trade volume by further integration with the EU.4  
 
 
                                                 
4 See also Di Mauro (2000) for studies on how economic integration affects trade and FDI in 
a gravity framework.  
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4. Data and model specification 
4.1.  The service trade models 
A main problem affecting all econometric research in the field of service 
trade is the lack of relevant data. However, the surge of interest in service 
trade in recent years has improved the conditions and our study takes 
advantage of newly available data on service trade flows as well as relevant 
statistics on barriers to such trade. We estimate the following baseline 
gravity equations: 
 
 
 (1)            1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8                            
a b b b b b
b b b e
ü
= + + + + +ý
þ
+ + + +
ij
ij i j i j
ij
j ij j ij
t
d y y yc yc
fdi
cpi FTA tri
 
 
 
where we use lower case letters as variables are expressed in logs. The 
variables ijt  and ijfdi  represent bilateral service exports and outgoing FDI 
stocks from country i to country j in 1999, respectively. Once again, FDI 
here serves as a proxy for foreign affiliate sales. One may claim that what we 
actually do is to conduct separate regressions for mode 1 and 2 trade (tij) and 
mode 3 trade (fdiij). However, this is not completely correct since the two 
specifications may capture some activity that sorts under other modes.  
 
Data on bilateral service exports is taken from the recently published 
OECD statistics on international trade in services, OECD (2002), which 
covers service exports from 22 OECD countries to their trading partners 
(including non-OECD countries).5 Data on bilateral outward FDI stocks are 
taken from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 
(2002), covering approximately the same countries. Both variables constitute 
what is regarded as service trade by the WTO. The OECD database on FDI 
stocks does not include bilateral data on service FDI. Hence we are forced to 
assume that the ratio of service FDI inflows to total FDI inflows to a 
particular host country is identical with respect to every parent country.  
 
The explanatory variables in (1) are as follows: dij represents the 
geographical distance between the capital of the exporting and the importing 
country, yi is GDP in country i in 1999, yci is GDP per capita in 1999, cpij is 
a measure of the level of corruption in country j, based on the index 
developed by Transparency International.6 FTAij is a dummy variable taking 
1 if the two countries i and j are linked through a regional free trade 
                                                 
5 The data sources are described in detail in the appendix (A.2). 
6 For more information on this index, see www.transparency.org 
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agreement. The trade restrictiveness variable trij is a measure of the barriers 
to service trade and FDI in country j.  
More on the Trade Restrictiveness Index 
Our data on barriers to service trade cover all forms of service trade (i.e. 
mode 1 through mode 4 trade). It is taken from the Trade Restrictiveness 
Index (TRI) database, developed by the Australian Productivity Commission 
in cooperation with the Australian National University.7 The database was 
originally developed by McGuire and Schuele (2000) for banking services 
and then applied by Kalirajan (2000), McGuire et al.(2000) and Nguyen-
Hong (2000) for other service sectors. Presently, the index covers the 
following sectors: Banking, telecom, maritime services, distribution 
(wholesale and retail), education and professional services (engineering, 
architectural and legal). The TRI is a pseudo-frequency ratio, which 
measures market regulations (market access both for domestic and foreign 
firms, in what is labeled the ‘domestic index’) and protection (exemptions 
from national treatment, in what is labeled the ‘foreign index’) for a wide 
variety of services and countries. The index contains separate measures for 
barriers affecting ongoing operations and barriers affecting new 
establishment of activity. Data is gathered from several different sources, not 
just the GATS schedules. Information is taken from APEC, WTO, ITU, 
OECD, Tradeport and USTR (Dee, 2001). A TRI listing is constructed as 
follows: First, all barriers affecting a particular sector are counted, then, the 
different impediments are assigned weights according to the researchers’ 
assessment of the economic impact of the particular NTB.  
 
There are several features and limitations of the index that are worth 
noting: First, the TRI is a pseudo-frequency measure, not a tariff equivalent. 
This means that the index does not provide information about likely impacts 
on prices, costs or rates of return in the economy. In principle, computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models will benefit from using a tariff 
equivalent, first pioneered by Hockman’s “guesstimate” (Hockman, 1995), 
instead of a frequency index. However, tariff equivalents are difficult to 
obtain for service trade, since there is a vast amount of NTBs for every 
country and each of them affects the economy differently for each sector.  
 
Second, the TRI does not measure anti-competitive practices 
(establishment barriers), like price-fixing, market-sharing arrangements and 
cartels. These barriers may vary from country to country, for example, a 
natural monopoly in Norway might not appear in the US, due to market size, 
variable fixed costs, etc. Fink, Matoo and Neago (2002) argue that private 
anti-competitive practices in the maritime industry have a stronger influence 
on prices than public restrictions. These results suggest that the TRI might 
exclude some important aspects of impediments to trade. As noted by 
Nguyen-Hong (2000), a higher score may simply reflect a greater 
availability of information, rather than a more restrictive regime. This bias 
                                                 
7 For more information on the TRI index, see http://www.pc.gov.au and Findlay and Warren 
(2001). 
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may arise when countries do not report all restrictions to relevant 
institutions. For example, in the GATS, areas and sectors that are left out of 
the schedules might have severe NTBs associated with them.  
 
Third, the indices have only been computed for six industries, which 
represent approximately 35 per cent of the 155 service sectors covered by 
Hockman (1995). This is an important limitation, since our econometric 
specification examines the effects of tri on total service trade, not sector 
specific trade.  In econometric terms, this means that our results might suffer 
from an omitted variable bias. However, compared to the Hockman index, 
which is only based on the GATS schedules, the TRI index is much richer 
and more detailed, based on a large variety of data sources.  
 
Fourth, we calculate the mean TRI for all countries, giving each industry 
for which a TRI is available equal weight. Obviously, this might generate 
biased results. Ideally, one should weight each sector specific TRI with an 
index reflecting the economic importance of imports for that particular 
sector. Our rationale for choosing the average-TRI approach is first of all 
that the sectors covered by the TRI are limited, and second, that the sector 
specific TRIs are highly correlated, i.e. a high telecom TRI is usually 
accompanied by a high maritime TRI. This means that the average TRI, to a 
certain extent, captures the general degree of protection in a country. 
Alternative model specifications 
The simple gravity model outlined in (1) may suffer from omitted variable 
bias because unobservable or unknown country specific effects are left out of 
the model. To deal with this problem, we construct an exporting country 
fixed-effects model. However it is not possible to simply apply such a fixed 
effects regression to model (1), since the income variables iy  and jy are 
perfectly collinear with the fixed effects. We deal with this problem by 
following Egger (2000) and Di Mauro (2000) who construct the alternative 
models:  
 
 
(2)       1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8            
a n b b b
b b b b b e
ü
= + + + +ý
þ
+ + + + + +
ij
i ij ij ij
ij
ij ij j ij j ij
t
d toty simy
fdi
totyc simyc cpi FTA tri
 
 
 
where ln( )ij i jtoty Y Y= +  and   
2 2ln 1 ( ) ( )jiij
i j i j
YY
simy
Y Y Y Y
é ù
= - -ê ú
+ +ê úë û
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The variable ijsimy  is bounded between 0 (absolute divergence in size) and 
0.5 (equal country size).8 The variables totycij and simycij are equivalent 
variables, but we substitute GDP with GDP per capita. We expect that 
income in both countries have the same impact on trade as in (1), i.e. 
economy size increases service trade and it is maximized when countries 
have similar income levels.  
5.   Econometric results 
Tables 2 and 3 report summary statistics and cross correlations respectively. 
The TRI indexes are bound between 0 and 1 with 1 representing prohibitive 
barriers. The corruption index varies between 0 and 10, where 10 represents 
the least possible corrupt regime.  
                                                 
8 Note what we are not able to include an importing country fixed effect jn , since this 
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Service export (Mill USD): bilateral 655 1099.8 3052.8 0.0 31848.0
Service outward FDI stock (Mill USD): bilateral 748 2674.8 10257.5 0.0 147862.8
GDP Parent (Bn USD) 1140 1066.9 2102.9 8.7 9228.0
GDP Host (Bn USD) 1074 636.2 1529.4 8.7 9228.0
GDP per capita Parent (USD) 1140 23069.6 12391.8 3540.0 45500.0
GDP cer capita Host (USD) 1071 15620.5 13342.9 250.0 45500.0
Distance (miles) 1097 3886.7 3033.5 106.0 12338.9
Trade restrictiveness index [0,1] 994 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.9
Corruption index [0,10] 1047 5.9 2.5 1.6 10.0
Table 3: Cross correlations
t fdi t+fdi y i y j yc i yc j toty simy totyc simyc d tri cpi
t 1.00
fdi 0.79 1.00
t+fdi 0.93 0.96 1.00
y i 0.53 0.55 0.57 1.00
y j 0.50 0.37 0.45 -0.06 1.00
yc i 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.01 -0.08 1.00
yc j 0.39 0.29 0.35 -0.05 0.34 0.05 1.00
toty 0.69 0.57 0.66 0.66 0.62 -0.05 0.19 1.00
simy -0.12 -0.01 -0.06 -0.38 0.13 -0.02 0.05 -0.51 1.00
totyc 0.40 0.26 0.34 -0.04 0.33 0.46 0.85 0.20 0.02 1.00
simyc 0.30 0.28 0.31 -0.03 0.24 -0.03 0.94 0.13 0.07 0.65 1.00
d -0.34 -0.22 -0.29 0.04 0.07 -0.20 -0.27 0.10 -0.05 -0.34 -0.21 1.00
tri -0.29 -0.28 -0.30 0.01 -0.24 -0.05 -0.73 -0.10 -0.15 -0.61 -0.69 0.09 1.00
cpi 0.30 0.24 0.28 -0.06 0.16 0.05 0.85 0.06 0.04 0.74 0.79 -0.27 -0.64 1.00
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The cross correlation matrix displays only a few worrisome signs of 
multicolinearity among explanatory variables. First, one should be 
concerned about the strong correlation between trade barriers (tri) and 
corruption (cpi). We deal with this problem by specifying two separate 
models where one of them is excluded, and a third model where both 
variables are represented (models 1 to 3). Second, trade barriers and 
corruption also correlate strongly with the GDP per capita variables (yc, 
totyc, simyc). Hence, we are forced to run regressions both with and without 
the GDP per capita variables in order to check for coefficient robustness in 
our models.  
 
In Tables 4, 5 and 6 we report the results based on the 7 models 
representing alternative econometric specifications of the service gravity 
model. In Table 4, we focus one service exports according to the OECD 
service trade figures, while Table 5 reports the results from the service FDI 
regressions which are believed to map the determinants of foreign affiliate 
sales. Finally, Table 6 reports results when we add service exports and FDI, 
serving as an overall measure of international trade in services between 
countries. Using a gravity model, it comes as no surprise that adjusted R2 is 
high in most model specifications (normally between 0.6 and 0.8).  
 
Models 1 to 5 are based on OLS regressions where we distinguish 
between parent (exporting) and host (importing) country GDP. The GDP 
coefficients are highly significant and show that there is a clear home market 
effect in both the export, the FDI and the sum of export and FDI regressions 
(i.e. the parent GDP coefficient is larger than the host country GDP 
coefficient). Since services are regarded as highly differenciated products, 
the results are consistent with the predictions made by Feenstra, Markusen 
and Rose (2001), where they find both theoretical and empirical evidence 
stating that more heterogeneous products display a stronger home market 
effect. In our exporting country fixed effects specification (models 6 and 7), 
both the total GDP and the similarity variables are highly significant for 
exports, FDI as well as the sum of them. Thus, the patterns of service trade 
with respect to market size largely mirror the patterns found for trade with 
heterogeneous commodities. 
 
Service trade barriers have a significant negative effect on service exports 
if corruption is excluded from the equation (models 1.A, 4.A and 6.A), but 
the significance disappears when we allow the corruption variable to enter. 
This is however not the case in our FDI and export + FDI regressions, where 
trade barriers have the expected and significant sign both with and without 
corruption. Hence, we believe that slightly insignificant pattern for service 
exports is driven by problems of multicolinearity. The elasticity of service 
exports and foreign affiliate sales with respect to corruption is strongly 
significant in all model versions except for 3.B where the significance level 
is marginally higher than 10%. We take this as solid evidence for a strong 
negative effect of corruption on service trade and foreign affiliate sales. 
 
                                                                                                                  
variable is fully collinear with jtri . 
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Table 4: Dependent variable: Service export
I.A II.A III.A IV.A V.A VI.A VII.A
GDP_P 1.22 *** 1.20 *** 1.23 *** 1.09 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
GDP_H 0.80 *** 0.82 *** 0.80 *** 0.79 ***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Distance -0.90 *** -0.82 *** -0.83 *** -0.52 *** -0.86 *** -0.91 *** -0.84 ***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Trade barriers H -0.70 *** -0.22 -0.46 * -0.21 -0.74 *** -0.24 *
(0.11) (0.16) (0.27) (0.15) (0.10) (0.15)
Corruption H 0.76 *** 0.73 *** 0.55 ** 0.51 **
(0.14) (0.17) (0.25) (0.21)
Regional FTA 0.17 0.06 -0.14 0.00
(0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15)
GDP per cap_P 2.04 *** 0.49 ***
(0.14) (0.13)
GDP per cap_H 0.44 *** 0.09
(0.10) (0.09)
Total_GDP 1.59 *** 1.53 ***
(0.06) (0.07)
Similar_GDP 0.55 *** 0.61 ***
(0.06) (0.06)
Total_GDP per cap 0.59 **
(0.23)
Similar GDP per cap -0.14
(0.09)
Constant -0.67 -1.73 *** -2.00 *** -15.93 *** -6.14 *** 2.32 *** -4.55 **
(0.41) (0.51) (0.56) (1.64) (1.27) (0.62) (2.21)
Number of obs 583 608 569 583 569 583 569
F-stats 347.4 293.56 241.45 95.82 213.55 125.79 113.18
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Adjusted R2 0.7705 0.7725 0.7834 0.4209 0.792 0.8396 0.854
Root MSE 1.2024 1.1954 1.1768 1.9103 1.1554 1.0232 0.98583
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parenthesis
*** = 0.01 sign. level   ** = 0.05 sign. level    * = 0.1 sign. level
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Table 5: Dependent variable: Service outward FDI stock
I.B II.B III.B IV.B V.B VI.B VII.B
GDP_P 1.40 *** 1.39 *** 1.41 *** 1.23 ***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
GDP_H 0.70 *** 0.77 *** 0.73 *** 0.78 ***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Distance -0.68 *** -0.51 *** -0.51 *** -0.39 *** -0.71 *** -0.71 *** -0.84 ***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09)
Trade barriers H -0.88 *** -0.45 * -0.63 * -0.76 *** -0.64 *** -0.72 ***
(0.19) (0.27) (0.34) (0.28) (0.16) (0.23)
Corruption H 0.51 *** 0.30 0.95 *** 1.26 ***
(0.19) (0.25) (0.30) (0.26)
Regional FTA 0.73 *** 0.59 * -0.09 -0.44 *
(0.26) (0.30) (0.25) (0.23)
GDP per cap_P 2.25 *** 1.53 ***
(0.14) (0.13)
GDP per cap_H 0.27 ** -0.33 ***
(0.13) (0.15)
Total_GDP 1.36 *** 1.65 ***
(0.11) (0.12)
Similar_GDP 0.89 *** 1.02 ***
(0.13) (0.12)
Total_GDP per cap -1.94 ***
(0.38)
Similar GDP per cap 0.21
(0.14)
Constant -2.92 *** -4.57 *** -4.69 *** -17.63 *** -15.88 *** 2.24 ** 19.98 ***
(0.71) (0.92) (1.08) (1.96) (1.68) (0.98) (3.62)
Number of obs 657 686 647 657 647 657 647
F-stats 277.66 241.22 195.86 82.78 187.88 97.7 86.5
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Adjusted R2 0.5784 0.5809 0.5844 0.2889 0.6767 0.7371 0.7638
Root MSE 1.9757 1.9508 1.9584 2.5649 1.7298 1.5821 1.4999
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parenthesis
*** = 0.01 sign. level   ** = 0.05 sign. level    * = 0.1 sign. level
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Table 6: Dependent variable: Service export + FDI
I.C II.C III.C IV.C V.C VI.C VII.C
GDP_P 2.40 *** 2.46 *** 2.43 *** 2.44 ***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
GDP_H 1.48 *** 1.52 *** 1.47 *** 1.54 ***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Distance -1.31 *** -1.32 *** -1.47 *** -0.89 *** -1.49 *** -1.35 *** -1.52 ***
(0.11) (0.16) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.10) (0.16)
Trade barriers H -1.88 *** -1.44 *** -1.69 ** -1.75 *** -1.71 *** -1.36 ***
(0.32) (0.42) (0.78) (0.50) (0.28) (0.41)
Corruption H 1.63 *** 0.94 ** 1.65 *** 2.03 ***
(0.33) (0.40) (0.52) (0.48)
Regional FTA -0.20 -0.83 * -0.81 * -0.64
(0.42) (0.48) (0.46) (0.41)
GDP per cap_P -0.03 0.42
(1.15) (0.63)
GDP per cap_H 0.62 ** -0.40 (*)
(0.27) (0.25)
Total_GDP 2.88 *** 3.18 ***
(0.20) (0.20)
Similar_GDP 1.61 *** 1.75 ***
(0.21) (0.20)
Total_GDP per cap -2.68 ***
(0.87)
Similar GDP per cap 0.31
(0.25)
Constant -4.14 *** -5.08 *** -3.83 ** 11.12 -6.42 2.81 27.87 ***
(1.22) (1.62) (1.80) (12.60) (7.19) (1.76) (8.48)
Number of obs 355 373 353 355 353 355 353
F-stats 246.96 208.52 166.3 24.73 128.27 104.99 83.06
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Adjusted R
2
0.7148 0.7199 0.7254 0.182 0.7284 0.7886 0.8081
Root MSE 2.335 2.3293 2.2942 3.9545 2.2881 2.0519 1.9636
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parenthesis
*** = 0.01 sign. level   ** = 0.05 sign. level    * = 0.1 sign. level
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Somewhat surprisingly, common membership in a regional free trade 
area has no stable and significant impact on service exports, or foreign 
affiliate sales. This may reflect the fact that many of the free trade 
agreements fail to include services. Furthermore, those free trade areas that 
have liberalized service trade, still struggle with strong impediments to 
service trade through national regulations etc.   
 
The elasticities of service exports and foreign affiliate sales with respect 
to distance are highly significant. Although there are theoretical arguments 
supporting both a positive and a negative effect of distance on foreign 
affiliate sales, earlier evidence shows that distance and trade barriers have a 
negative, but less dampening effect on foreign affiliate sales than exports 
(Brainard, 1997, Eaton & Tamura, 1996). These results have an intuitive 
explanation. Although multinational firms do not have positive variable 
transport costs, distance may play a key role because it is correlated with the 
costs of moving personnel to the host country, communication costs, cultural 
differences, etc. We are also interested in the absolute value of the distance 
elasticity. According to the endogenous sunk cost model by Melchior (2002) 
one should expect that distance is more detrimental to service trade than 
trade in goods (see section 2 for more on this). Compared to the results of Di 
Mauro (2000), the size of our elasticities is significantly larger. However, Di 
Mauro operates with a slightly different econometric specification and 
simple comparison of the estimated coefficients may yield incorrect 
conclusions. 
 
Finally, we identify a surprising pattern when we look at the effect of 
GDP per capita on service trade and foreign affiliate sales. In model 4.A and 
4.B we find that this wealth variable has the expected signs as long as we 
leave out the market size variables. However, in  models 5 and 7, we see that 
GDP per capita in the importing country (host) has no significant impact on 
service trade. If there is any effect, one may actually claim that it is negative 
(see model 5.B and 5.C). Hence the patterns of service trade depicted in 
Figure 2 and 3 seams to be supported in regressions where other factors are 
considered. That is, a rich country will not import more services, ceteris 
paribus. We believe that this pattern has not been pointed out before, 
however, Mirza and Nicoletti (2004) find the same pattern, yet they interpret 
it differently. In their study, it is claimed that service trade requires inputs 
both from the exporting and the importing country. A rich importing country 
will have high input costs (wages), driving up the price of services, which 
has a negative effect on service trade. However, the two stories do not 
necessarily conflict, since a competitive advantage may coexist with 
relatively high input cots as long as  services are highly differentiated.   
5.2   Full service trade liberalization and predicted trade flows  
Given that the TRI in fact captures all barriers to trade, we are now able to 
predict world service trade under a fully liberalized regime. Predicted service 
exports and foreign affiliate sales under free trade are based on the results 
from models 6A and 6B. Since it is hard to imagine a case where there are 
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no barriers to service trade what so ever, we do not apply TRI=0 as the 
measure of full liberalization. Rather, we use the lowest registered TRI in 
our sample, which is assigned to Finland (0.12). The percentage change in 
service trade from liberalization is then given by 
 
(6)      
( )
( )
ˆ ˆ
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where all export and FDI figures are based on estimates from models 6A and 
6B, so that we take into account unobserved variation in the sample through 
exporting country fixed effects. Figure 4 displays the percentage change in 
predicted service exports and FDI if trade is liberalized.  
Figure 4: Increase in service export and FDI due to liberalization
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The main message based on this exercise is that all countries increase 
their service exports and foreign affiliate sales considerably in response to 
service trade liberalization. It is also important to notice that the effect on 
patterns of trade is rather similar for all exporting countries. Spain, Japan, 
Korea, and Ireland are the countries with the largest potential increase in 
exports, while France, Germany and the Nordic countries have less to gain in 
terms of exports. However, the strongest increase is less than 50% while the 
smallest increase is more than 35%, so the differences are small. The pattern 
for service foreign affiliate sales is rather similar to those found in the 
service exports exercise. Yet, Ireland, the Netherlands and Finland seam to 
have relatively much to gain in terms of outward FDI.   
 
5.3. Are service exports and foreign affiliate sales complements or 
substitutes? 
Since the late 60s, the issue of whether trade and foreign direct investment 
are complements or substitutes has received much attention. Early studies of 
this kind are Reddaway et al. (1967) and Hufbauer & Adler (1968). They 
found that outward FDI stimulates exports (mostly capital and intermediate 
goods), without stimulating imports in an equal magnitude. Lipsey and 
Weiss (1981) used data of US outward FDI and exports, and their results 
also suggested that the relationship was complementary, even after 
controlling for firm size, expenditures on R&D, marketing, etc. Fontagné 
(1999) found that outward FDI stimulates growth of exports from the same 
country and that each dollar of outward FDI produces about two dollars’ 
worth of increased exports. However, a complementary relationship at the 
macro level does not necessarily imply complementarity at the firm-, sector- 
or product-level. Blonigen (2001) examined product-level data for different 
Japanese automobile parts, and he found evidence for both a substitution and 
a complementarity effect between exports and affiliate sales for the US 
market. 
 
Estimating the relationship between service exports and foreign affiliate 
sales in a regression a la ( )ij ij ijfdi ta b e= + +  is not very useful, because 
both variables might respond to a common element, for example income, 
thereby generating spurious correlations. We will follow the approach of 
Graham (1996). We assume that the gravity equations from model 7A and 
7B remove all factors that might simultaneously determine exports and 
foreign affiliate sales, and we then examine the relationship between these 
variables when the source of the simultaneity bias is removed. The model is 
 
(7)      ˆ ˆij ijv ua g= +  
 
where ijvˆ  and ijuˆ  represent the residuals from least squares regression of 
model 7 when the dependent variable is FDI and exports, respectively. A 
positive gˆ  will then signify that unexplained variation in FDI is 
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accompanied by unexplained variation in exports (in the same direction). In 
other words, that foreign affiliate sales and exports are complements. Note 
that this procedure crucially rests on the assumption that the gravity equation 
from models 7A and 7B actually removed all causal elements from the 
dependent variables – that the gravity equation is a “true” representation of 
reality, which is obviously a crude approximation. Hence, we interpret our 
results with caution.  
 
Ordinary least squares on (7) yields results reported in the first column in 
Table 7. gˆ  is positive and highly significant, suggesting that the relationship 
is complementary – if exports from country i to j are 1 unit above “normal” 
(above the predicted value), then FDI outstocks are 0.70 units above normal.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this work we have examined aggregate service trade flows, studying both 
service supply through commercial presence and cross-border supply within 
the gravity framework. First, we find a strong negative effect of barriers to 
service trade on service exports and FDI, which we view as a proxy for 
foreign affiliate sales. Removing these barriers may increase exports as 
much as 50%, and all exporting countries in our sample will raise exports 
due to liberalization. Second, distance has a considerable negative impact on 
exports and foreign affiliate sales. Compared to figures for total trade – not 
only services - in Di Mauro(2000), distance has a greater impact on service 
trade, which was predicted in our theoretical discussion. GDP has significant 
positive effects on service trade and foreign affiliate sales, yet we identify a 
strong home market effect that probably indicates that services are highly 
heterogonous in nature. Third, in the fixed-effects model specifications we 
observe that similar income levels have a much stronger impact on outward 
FDI stocks (and thus foreign affiliate sales) than exports, which suggest that 
a “Markusen-effect” is at play – the ratio of affiliate sales to exports is 
increasing when countries converge in income. Fourth, contrary to the 
predictions of the horizontal Markusen model, we find that aggregate exports 
Table 7: OLS residual regression
Dependent variable
Constant 0.03
(0.07)
Exports residual 0.70 ***
(0.08)
Number of obs 354
F( 23,   451) 74.72
Prob > F 0.00
R-squared 0.18
Root MSE 1.3291
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* = 10% significance level   ** = 5% significance level   *** = 1 % significance level
FDI residual
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and foreign affiliate sales from the same parent country are complements. 
This result does not seem to crucially depend on the exact specification of 
the gravity model – alternative specifications (OLS and fixed effects) yield 
the same result. Nevertheless, we interpret this result with caution – if we 
have left out important variables that affect both export and foreign affiliate 
sales, we could get spurious results. 
 
The recently published bilateral data on service trade and impediments to 
trade allows more thorough studies of the drivers behind such trade. Also, 
the new initiative to coordinate and improve data on international trade in 
services through the UN and other organizations, will lay the foundation for 
improved empirical analysis within a field that unquestionably will attract 
increased attention during the next years. This study should be viewed as 
only a first attempt to approach the large number of issues on the 
determinants of international service trade and the effects of service trade 
liberalization.  
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Appendix 1: Country specific trade restrictiveness index 
values (TRI) 
Table A1: Average trade restrictiveness
Country TRI Country TRI
Finland 0.12 Austria 0.34
United Kingdom 0.14 Mexico 0.35
Netherlands 0.16 India 0.40
Norway 0.17 Thailand 0.41
Denmark 0.19 Turkey 0.44
Argentina 0.20 Philippines 0.46
Hong Kong (China) 0.21 Czech Republic 0.47
Australia 0.22 Indonesia 0.47
Sweden 0.23 Malaysia 0.47
New Zealand 0.24 Iceland 0.50
Ireland 0.24 Romania 0.50
South Africa 0.25 Hungary 0.53
France 0.25 Israel 0.53
Germany 0.26 Pakistan 0.55
Switzerland 0.26 Ukraine 0.60
United States 0.26 Bulgaria 0.62
Singapore 0.26 Egypt 0.63
Chile 0.26 Panama 0.63
Japan 0.28 Poland 0.66
Greece 0.28 Nigeria 0.79
Italy 0.29 China 0.81
Spain 0.30 United Arab Emirates 0.84
Canada 0.31 Algeria 0.87
Portugal 0.32 Saudi Arabia 0.87
Korea 0.33 Iran 0.88
Venezuela 0.33 Morocco 0.90
Brazil 0.34 Costa Rica 0.93
Colombia 0.34
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Appendix 2: Data sources 
 
Mode-1 service trade data is gathered from OECD’s Statistics on 
International Trade in Services (2002), which includes multilateral imports 
and exports data for parent (22 OECD member countries) and host countries 
(55 OECD and non-OECD countries). These 22 OECD countries accounted 
for about 74 per cent of world service exports and 70 percent of world 
service imports. The data is provided for two years, 1999 and 2000, and is 
expressed in millions of US dollars. The full publication can be found at 
http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00032000/M00032981.pdf. 
 
FDI data is gathered from the OECD International Direct Investment 
Statistics Yearbook (2002). The database includes measures of multilateral 
FDI inflows, outflows, inward stock and outward stock, for 30 OECD parent 
countries as well as a multitude of OECD and non-OECD host countries. As 
described in Section 4, we have weighed these data with a calculated service 
share, compiled from OECD’s “International direct investment by industrial 
sector Vol 2001 release 02”.  We have used 1999 data, expressed in millions 
of US dollars. 
 
We have used 1999-GDP and the service sector’s contribution to 1999-
GDP data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 
database (http://www.worldbank.org/data). GDP figures are provided in 
billions current US dollars. Service GDP data is provided in billions of 1995 
US dollars. 
 
The  ‘trade restrictiveness index’ (TRI), compiled by The Australian 
Productivity Commission and the Australian National University, measures 
the degree of impediments to trade in the following sectors: Banking, 
telecom, maritime services, distribution (wholesale and retail), education and 
professional services (engineering, architect, legal). The TRI covers all 
modes of supply and ranges from 0 to 1 (fully protected). The database can 
be found at http://www.pc.gov.au/research/memoranda/servicesrestriction.  
 
The corruption perceptions index (CPI), 2002 edition, is constructed by 
Transparency International (http://www.transparency.org). The score is 
ranging from 0 to 10, 10 signifying a highly clean country. At present, 102 
countries are covered. 
 
